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Abstract. We re-evaluate the impact of wire resistance on the noise voltage and current in the
Johnson-(like)-noise based secure communicator, correcting the result presented in [Physics
Letters A 359 (2006) 737]. The analysis shown here is based on the fluctuation-dissipation and
the linear response theorems. The results indicate that the impact of wire resistance in practical
communicators is significantly lower than the previous estimation.
1. Introduction
Following the introduction of the Kirchhoff Law and Johnson (-like) Noise (KLJN)
cipher [1], it was suggested that the system was vulnerable to time domain analysis of the
currents and voltages evolution in the system [2, 3] as well as to the voltage drop on the
non-ideal wire [2, 4]. The time domain claims and related statistical issues were answered
in [5,6]. In the present paper, we revisit the analysis of the impact of the wire resistance,
showing that in fact the expression derived in [2] was inaccurate. Here we present the
correct derivation of the problem of wire resistance.
Before the analysis we would like to emphasize the following remarks:
a) In the experimental realization of the KJLN communicator by Mingesz, et al [7], the
wire resistance was 2% of the sum of Alice's Bob's driving resistances. Based on the
measured voltage distributions, the raw information leak accessible by Eve in this case
(before privacy amplification) was estimated to be 0.19% of the key bits, a value which is
substantially better than in any typical quantum key distribution. This value indicates a
much higher security than practical quantum mechanical based systems where Eve has
utilized proper non-idealities for attack [8-10].
b) We emphasize that, the fully protected version of the KLJN key exchanger [7,11], is
less susceptible to any attack based on detecting differences in the voltage or current
along the wire. Alice and Bob are continuously measuring the voltage and current data at
the two ends of the line, and are broadcasting and comparing these data via public
2channels [7, 11]. Thus they exactly know all the information accessible to Eve and can
act accordingly [6] by discarding key bits where security has been compromised beyond
a certain threshold. Just for comparison, QKD systems also offer some relevant
protection but at a lower efficiency level because it necessitates the evaluation of the
error statistics over a sequence of bits, an operation that requires a long record. However,
in the KLJN protocol, Alice and Bob have the full knowledge of Eve's best guess for
each bit [6], thus knowing if this guess is correct or not. This is in contrast to QKD
(where Alice and Bob do not know Eve's measurement outcome), and originating from
the classical physical nature and robustness of the information transfer [6].
2. The results in [2] and their implications
According to Eqs. (12) in [2] the voltage and current power density spectra measured by
Eve at an asymmetric point in the wire [2] with wire resistances 
  RW1 and   RW 2  toward
Alice and Bob, respectively (
  RW1 + RW 2 = RW ) are:
  
Sch( f ) =
4kT[RA( RB + RW 2 ) + RB ( RA + RW1)]
RA + RB + RW 2 + RW1
(1)
  
Si ( f ) =
4kT (RA + RB )
RA + RB +RW 2+RW1
, (2)
where   Sch( f )  is the power density spectrum of the channel voltage at the given point in
the wire,   Si ( f )  is the power density spectrum of the current in the wire (loop current),
  RA is Alice's resistance and   RB  is Bob's resistance,   k  is the Boltzmann constant, and   T
is the effective absolute temperature of the noise generators of Alice and Bob. The
Johnson noise of the wire is neglected because   T  is orders of magnitudes greater than the
ambient temperature, corresponding to an external voltage noise generator.
To observe the highest voltage drop on the wire, that is, to extract the greatest amount of
information, Eve must measure at the two ends of the wire and compare the voltages.
Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we suppose: RW1 = 0 and RW 2 = RW .  Eq. (1) then yields
that the noise voltage at Alice's end is:
  
Sch, A( f ) =
4kT[RA(RB + RW ) + RB RA]
RA + RB + RW
(3)
Applying Eq. 3 for Bob's end of the channel we use 
  RW1 = RW  and   RW 2 = 0 thus:
  
Sch,B ( f ) =
4kT[RARB + RB (RA + RW )]
RA + RB + RW
, (4)
Finally, Eve extracts the most information when she measures at both ends and compares
the voltages. Note, that in the practical run, Eve does not even have to measure anything
3because the current and voltage values measured at the two ends are broadcasted (and
compared) via public channels by Alice and Bob for a full protection against invasive
attacks [6,11]. This also means, as we have already mentioned, that Alice and Bob are
well aware of the actual voltage drop and the best guess of the bits by Eve [6].
Eve can extract significant information only when (the voltage-based alarm [11] is off
and) the difference between the mean-square of the noise voltages (spectra integrated
over the whole frequency range of operation) at the two ends is approaching or greater
than the statistical inaccuracies of them during the finite sampling which is limited by the
duration of the clock period. The difference between the spectra is:
Su,AB ( f ) =
4kT[RW (RA  RB )]
RA + RB + RW
(5)
3. Analysis of the results of [2] shown above
Referring to Eqs. (3, 4), we note that in the case of zero wire resistance   RW = 0, the
voltage noise spectrum is twice as large than what can be expected of a system
comprising a set of two resistors RA and RB connected in parallel. This fact indicates that
the results in [2] are inaccurate. The correct result, shown below, indicates significantly
less information for Eve than the relevant result in [2], as shown in Section 5.
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Figure 1. Circuit model to calculate the power density spectra of the channel voltage at Alice's and Bob's
ends (left and right circuits). Similarly to the assumptions of [2], the effective temperature T of the voltage
generators is supposed to be so high that the thermal noise of the wire is negligible.
4. The wire resistance problem
In Figure 1, the model circuits for the straightforward calculation of the voltage noise
spectra at Alice's end (left panel ) and Bob's ends (right panel) are shown. Alice's voltage
generator has   U A(t )  voltage amplitude and   SA( f ) = 4kTRA  spectrum, where T is the
4effective temperature. Similarly, Bob's voltage generator has   UB (t )  voltage amplitude
and   SB ( f ) = 4kTRB  spectrum. Similarly to [2], the effective temperature T of the voltage
generators is assumed to be substantially higher than the thermal noise of the wire, which
is, therefore, neglected.
The instantaneous channel voltage amplitude at Alice's end of the wire is the linear
superposition of Alice's and Bob's generator voltages after reduced by appropriate voltage
divider terms:
  
Uch, A(t ) =U A(t )
RW + RB
RA + RW + RB
+UB (t )
RA
RA + RW + RB
(6)
Similarly, the channel voltage at Bob's end:
  
Uch,B (t ) =UB (t )
RW + RA
RA + RW + RB
+U A(t )
RB
RA + RW + RB
(7)
Because the two noise voltages are statistically independent, the rule of linear operations
on noises can be applied to get the separate noise spectra, and no cross-term appears:
  
Sch, A( f ) = SA( f )
RW + RB
RA + RW + RB
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and
  
Sch,B ( f ) = SB ( f )
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where Teff is the effective temperature of the noise sources (Teff>>T). We note that for the
zero wire resistance case Eqs. (8, 9) do provide the correct expression for the Johnson
noise: 
  
Sch( f ) = 4kTeff RARB /(RA + RB ) .
The difference between the measured voltage noise spectra at the two ends is the
difference between (8) and (9):
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Sch, AB ( f ) = 4kTeff
RW
2 (RA  RB )
( RA + RW + RB )
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(10)
5. Comparison of the results of [2] and that of the current derivation
Let us suppose, that at a given secure bit exchange, Alice uses the larger resistor and Bob
uses the smaller one. For simplicity, we assume the following relations between the
resistances:
  RW << RB << RA (11)
Then, for the difference of the spectra at the two ends, according to Eq. (5), yields:
WeffBAch RkTfS 4)(,
]2[  , (12)
while (10) yields:
  
Sch, AB ( f )  4kTeff
RW
2
RA
(13)
For the relative difference of the spectra compared to the channel voltage spectrum,
  
 4kTeff RB  , we get the following estimations by Eq. (12 and 13):
Based on ref. [2] :
B
W
ch
BAch
R
R
fS
fS 
)(
)(,
]2[
(14)
Based on Eq. (13) :
  
Sch, AB ( f )
Sch( f )
 RW
2
RARB
(15)
For example, with   RA =100 k ,   RB =1 k ,   RW =100  , Eq. (14) yields 0.1 while Eq.
(15) yields 10-4 which is 3 orders of magnitude lower. This means that, according to this
analysis, Eve needs 103 times longer measurement window to resolve the bit situation
compared to the results of [2] because the uncertainty is mean-square estimation is
inversely proportional with the measurement time window for band-limited white noise
in the long-time limit.
Conclusions
6The research of secure communication is progressing by a continuous process of
proposing new schemes, attempting to break/attacking them, followed by the
development of defense mechanisms and/or modified schemes. We revisited the impact
of finite resistance on the KLJN cipher and found that that the predicted information leak
due to parasitic wire resistance is significantly less than it was previously estimated. In
addition, the scheme can be improved to counteract such attacks because Alice and Bob
can determine Eve's best guess based on the voltage difference at the two ends [6]. If
these security measures are still insufficient, the same path can be followed as with
quantum communicators: applying privacy amplification to the exchanged key.
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